For those who need a refresher on basic economics, Pareto efficiency is an economic arrangement where no more exchanges can be made that could make someone better off without making anyone worse off. A Pareto improvement is any change that can make someone better off without making anyone worse off, and as such, another way to think of Pareto efficiency is a state when no more Pareto improvements can be made.
Today I was thinking about how the concept could be applied to normative ethics. Obviously, we have to assume some sort of consequentialist framework.
Suppose we are act consequentialists. We might say we have an obligation to perform actions that are “moral Pareto improvements.”
What I find more interesting, though, is how this could apply to rule consequentialism. When constructing our prima facie moral rules, we could say we should follow rules the general adoption of which would in principle allow a “morally Pareto efficient” situation to come about. In other words, we ought to follow the rules that the general adoption of which would lead to a situation where no one could make anyone better off without making someone else worse off.
This isn’t meant to constitute a new, complete first-order moral theory, but rather provides what I think is an interesting addition to consequentialism’s conceptual toolkit.
Rational A Priori 